Nuclear Israel
Dr. Ahmed El-Meadawy
1 September 2006
The Holocaust:
During the World War II from 1939 to 1945, Nazi Germany under the leadership of Adolf Hitler destroyed some six million European Jews. They were put in large sealed halls, and then exposed to toxic gases. This was the cheapest way to destroy human beings. As the victims were still alive, the Nazi soldiers shaved their heads to use the hair to fill pillows and mattresses for German use. The skins were used for soap production. Nazi scientists conducted scientific experiments on some of the victims, alive. The corpses were, then, burnt in special ovens, and converted into dust to eliminate the massacres’ evidence. The victims’ properties were confiscated by the Nazi State. Not only the Jews, but also, Romany people, Slavs, intellectuals, homosexuals, and political dissidents were exterminated by the Nazi Germans.
As the Allies defeated the Nazi Armies, occupied Germany completely, and brought the war to an end, the Nazi plans to entirely destroy the European Jews had failed. The remaining liberated Jews returned to their homes, and found that all their relatives had been murdered, and their properties stolen. They came to the conclusion that Europe could not be a home for them anymore, and decided to immigrate to Palestine and to endure any hurdles to achieve that goal, the creation of a Jewish home land in Palestine. All expected difficulties were considered much easier than what they have already endured. At that time, the Jewish organizations were very active in organizing the immigration of the world Jews illegally to Palestine, which was under British occupation.
The Jewish organizations and their allies, mainly in the USA, succeeded in convincing the world powers, especially the American president Harry Truman, to use the United Nations as an instrument to divide Palestine between the native Palestinians and the immigrating Jews. As a result of the pressure the American and many European governments put on smaller countries, a decision was made by the UN on November 29th, 1947, dividing Palestine as the Jewish Organizations wanted.
On May 14th, 1948, Ben-Gurion (the founder and first prime-minister), declared the establishment of the state of Israel. The Israelis celebrate that date and call it their independence day, while the Palestinians mourn and call it “the catastrophe day”.
Nuclear Israel:
The idea of a nuclear Israel was born with the birth of the state of Israel. The Holocaust was the justification for any measure taken by Israel to protect its Jewish population and their new born state.
In 1949, Hemed Gimmel led the Israeli search for Uranium in the Negev Desert. In 1952, Ben-Gurion created Israel Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC), and hired Ernst David Bergmann, to chair it. Bergmann, the father of the Israeli Nuclear Bomb, advocated an Israeli bomb as the best way to ensure that “we shall never again be led as lambs to the slaughter.” The IAEC was put under the supervision of Shimon Peres, the Director General of the Ministry of Defense, who had convinced Ben-Gurion to pursue, and was responsible for building Israel’s nuclear capability for some thirty years under complete secrecy.
The French Ally:
France was the first to help Israel to build the atomic bomb. This co-operation continued during the 50s and 60s of the last century. France was, also, the main arms supplier to Israel during that period.
There had been three reasons for the French support to the Israeli Atomic Project. The first one was rewarding Israel for its invasion of Sinai during the 1956 war, as the British and French armies invaded Egypt from the Mediterranean Sea into the Suez Canal. This was to weaken Egypt which was supporting the Algerian Revolution against the French occupation. The invasion was the British answer to the nationalization of Suez Canal by the Egyptian Government. The second reason was, also, rewarding Israel for spying by the Jews in Algeria on behalf of France against the liberation movement, as the Jewish in Algeria were loyal to Israel rather than to Algeria. The third and most important motive was the embargo of certain nuclear enabling computer technology imposed by the USA to prevent France form building its own nuclear bomb according to The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Israel was able to purchase that technology and heavy water from the USA, and passed them through to France.
In 1956, hundreds of French technicians flooded the Negev Desert to construct the top-secret Dimona Nuclear Reactor and a plant for the nuclear bomb production underground to elude the American and Soviet spy satellites. The reactor started to function in 1964. France provided Israel with all its needs of the technology and ingredients needed for the production of the Israeli Nuclear Bomb.
The French and Israeli nuclear co-operation included the Israeli involvement in the preproduction design of the early Mirage jet aircraft intended to be capable of delivering nuclear bombs.
Promising Israeli students went overseas to study nuclear engineering and physics at the Israeli government expense. Of the Negev Nuclear Research Center’s 2,700 workers, only 150 are allowed to enter the Holy Land’s Machon 2 nuclear bomb factory that consists of 6 floors. Machon 4 is the chief laboratory where the process for extracting the uranium found in the Negev Desert has been perfected, and a new method of producing heavy water had been developed providing Israel with an indigenous capability to produce some of the most important nuclear materials.
The British/Norwegian Allies:
In 1959 and 1960, Britain sold 20 tons of heavy water to Israel. In the 1950s and 1960s, Britain made hundreds of secret shipments of restricted materials to Israel including Uranium 235 in 1959 and plutonium in 1966. The transactions were made through a Norwegian front company called Noratom which took a 2% commission on the transactions.
Israeli Nuclear Arsenal:
In 1986, The Sunday Times, published in London (Britain), information provided by Mordechai Vanunu, an Israeli of Moroccan origin and a former employee with the Negev Nuclear Research Center. Experts used that information to estimate the size of the Israeli nuclear arsenal. It is believed that Israel was capable of producing 40 kg of plutonium annually, and atomic bombs with as little as 4 kg of plutonium for each one. That amount of plutonium was enough to produce 10-12 nuclear bombs a year. It is estimated that Israel owns 200-500 atomic bombs with boosted devices, neutron bombs, F-16 deliverable warheads, and Jericho warheads. Experts believe, as well, that Israel’s nuclear arsenal equals each of the British and French arsenals in quantity and quality, but they disagree whether it is the fifth or the sixth nuclear power in the world. The Israeli nuclear arsenal is thought to be of offensive nature and designed to be employed under the Middle East conditions. Israel, also, owns miniaturized thermonuclear bombs designed to maximize deadly gamma radiation while minimizing blast effects and long term radiation, in essence designed to kill people while leaving property intact. This would be useful for Israeli future expansions. Israel might possess 20 hydrogen bombs. A hydrogen bomb is a boosted, 100-1000-times stronger nuclear bomb than a regular one. This bomb produces immense heat and a shock wave that affects an extensive area, and despite this, it produces a smaller amount of fallout and radioactive contamination.
Israeli Nuclear Delivery Capabilities:
Israel uses short range Jericho I and medium range Jericho II missiles to carry the nuclear heads to their targets. Those missiles are hidden in underground bunkers spread all around Israel. It, also, has American made Harpoon and Cruise missiles capable of carrying nuclear heads and hitting targets 1,500 kilometers away.
In 1988, Israel began launching several Ofek satellites into orbit atop Shavit (Comet) three-stage rockets, which are derived from the Jericho II missile. The first satellite weighed about 180 kilograms; the most recent, the Ofek 5, about 300 kilograms. The satellites monitor activities in hostile states and provide intelligence. The Shavit could be converted into a long-range ballistic missile, with a range of up to 7,000 kilometers, depending on the weight of the warhead.
Israel has modified American-supplied cruise missiles to carry nuclear warheads on submarines, giving the Middle East’s only nuclear power the ability to launch atomic weapons from land, air and beneath the sea. Israel possesses hundreds of nuclear artillery shells, land mines, and low radiating neutron bombs.
In addition, Israel possesses American jets capable of carrying and delivering the nuclear heads including F-4 Phantom, F-15E, F-16, and A-4 Skyhawks. The F-16 has been the backbone of the Israeli Air Force and is the most likely candidate for air delivery of nuclear weapons. From 1980 to 1995, Israel bought or received 260 F-16s from the United States: 103 F-16As, 22 F-16Bs, 81 F-16Cs, and 54 F-16Ds. In 1999, the Israeli government announced it would buy 50 F-16Is, at a cost of about $2.5 billion. Israel will receive the aircrafts over a two-year period beginning in early 2003. Under this contract, Israel has the option to purchase 60 additional aircraft. If it does, delivery would continue through 2008.
The American Ally:
The United States first became aware of Dimona’s existence after U-2 overflights in 1958 captured the facility’s construction, but it was not identified as a nuclear site until two years later. The complex was variously explained as a textile plant, an agricultural station, and a metallurgical research facility, until David Ben-Gurion stated in December 1960 that Dimona complex was a nuclear research center built for “peaceful purposes.” As early as 8 December 1960, the CIA issued a report outlining Dimona’s implications for nuclear proliferation, and the CIA station in Tel Aviv had determined by the mid-1960s that the Israeli nuclear weapons program was an established and irreversible fact.
Richard Nixon and his chief foreign policy adviser Henry Kissinger privately endorsed Israel’s program and reached a secret understanding with the Israelis in 1969 that allowed them to pursue their nuclear program as long as they maintained a policy of deliberate ambiguity. Nixon in a meeting with the former Labor Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir pressed Israel to “make no visible introduction of nuclear weapons or undertake a nuclear test program”. His administration went to great lengths to keep nuclear issues out of any talks on the Middle East. Information on Israeli nuclear capabilities was routinely suppressed. The United States even supplied Israel with krytrons (nuclear triggers) and supercomputers that were bound for the Israeli nuclear program.
Top officials in the Reagan administration made a conscious effort to keep information on Israel’s nuclear capability from State Department officials and others who might have had concerns over nuclear proliferation issues.
The senior Bush administration sold at least 1,500 nuclear “dual-use” items to Israel, according to a report by the General Accounting Office, despite requirements under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty that the existing nuclear powers like the United States not help another country’s nuclear weapons program “in any way.”
The Israeli media reported that President Clinton wrote the rightist Israeli Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu in 1998 pledging that the United States would continue to protect Israel’s nuclear program from international pressure. According to Haaretz, “the United States will preserve Israel’s strategic deterrence capabilities and ensure that Middle East arms control initiatives will not damage it in the future. The Clinton letter provided written – if secret – backup to the long-standing agreement between Jerusalem and Washington over the preservation of Israel’s nuclear capabilities, if Israel maintains its policy of ‘ambiguity’ and does not announce publicly that it has the bomb.”
Meanwhile, Congress has for many years made it clear to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and other responsible parties that it did not want to have anything revealed in an open hearing related to Israel’s nuclear capability. A major reason is that there are a number of laws that severely restrict US military and technical assistance to countries that develop nuclear weapons. Israel is the largest recipient of US arms exports, which are highly profitable for the politically influential arms industry.
In addition, given the enormous costs of any nuclear program of such magnitude, it would have been very difficult for Israel to develop such a large and advanced arsenal without the tens of billions of dollars in unrestricted American financial support. More than simply employing a double standard of threatening perceived enemies for developing nuclear weapons while tolerating development of such weapons by its allies, the United States has, in effect, subsidized nuclear proliferation in the Middle East.
What both Republican and Democratic leaders have failed to observe, however, is that Israel remains in violation of UN Security Council resolution 487, which calls on Israel to place its facilities at Dimona under the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) trusteeship. Despite bipartisan efforts in Congress to seek repeal of that resolution, it is still legally binding. Bush and Kerry, however, believe that UN Security Council resolutions, like nuclear nonproliferation, do not apply to US allies.
Furthermore, while one could make a case for an Israeli nuclear deterrent up through the mid-1970s, Israel’s qualitative advantage in conventional forces relative to any combination of Arab states developed subsequently – resulting in large part from a phenomenal amount of taxpayer-funded arms transfers from the United States – would appear to weaken the case for a nuclear weapons development. Furthermore, Israel has an extensive biological and chemical weapons program that far surpasses those of any potential hostile powers and – combined with vastly superior delivery systems – would constitute a more-than-adequate deterrent
Like Israel, the United States has acknowledged its willingness to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear adversaries.
The German Nuclear Submarines:
At the end of the 1990s, the Jewish state, with a coastline of 270 kilometers, acquired three German-built diesel-powered Dolphin-class submarines equipped with American-made Harpoon missiles modified to carry small nuclear warheads. The submarines were produced by the German companies Thyssen Nordseewerke in Emden and Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werft in Kiel. Israel has succeeded in modifying U.S.-made Cruise missiles, capable of carrying nuclear warheads, to be launched from those submarines. With its three submarines, Israel could deploy one nuclear-armed submarine at sea at all times. The most invulnerable types of nuclear-armed sea-based systems traditionally have been submarines. The first submarine, the Dolphin, arrived in Haifa on July 27, 1999. The Leviathan joined the fleet before the end of 1999, and the third boat, the Tekumah, was delivered in July 2000. The cost of each submarine is estimated at $300 million.
Israeli Nuclear Readiness:
It is believed that Israel was able in 1966 to produce enough plutonium that allowed the assembly of 2 atomic bombs before the 1967 6-days war, during which Israel declared its first nuclear alert. The two bombs were available for use in case of an Israeli defeat.
The second Israeli nuclear alert was during the 1973 Yom Kippur War. It is reported that, fearing defeat, the Israelis assembled 13 twenty-kiloton atomic bombs, deployed, and considered using them. The Arabs may have limited their war aims because of their knowledge of the Israeli nuclear weapons. During that war, Israel used nuclear blackmail to force Kissinger and Nixon to airlift massive amounts of military hardware to Israel.
Israel entered the third nuclear alert during the Golf War started on January 18th, 1991 for the 43 days of the war, during which Saddam Hussein launched 40 Scud Missiles in 17 attacks at Israel, none of which caused any significant damage.
Israeli Nuclear Strategy:
The Israeli government refuses to officially confirm or deny that it has a nuclear weapon program, and has an unofficial but rigidly enforced policy of deliberate ambiguity supported by the United States. Both countries consider Israel a non nuclear state, when preventing other Middle East, Arab or Moslem nations from developing nuclear weapons. On the other hand, the nuclear Israeli threat is used to impose Israeli terms on those countries.
It is believed that Israel possesses all kinds known of weapons of mass destruction, chemical, biological, and nuclear. This is a foundation on which the Israeli grand strategy rests to protect its expansion policy and to force the neighboring Arab states to sign peace agreements without the return of all occupied territories. It is also used to protect the so called Arabic moderate regimes against internal instabilities. Munya Mardoch, Director of the Israeli Institute for the Development of Weaponry, said in 1994, “The moral and political meaning of nuclear weapons is that states which renounce their use are acquiescing to the status of Vassal states. All those states which feel satisfied with possessing conventional weapons alone are fated to become vassal states.
To enable Israel to abstain from dependence on nuclear arms, the United States has been providing Israel with $2 to 3 billion per year in U.S. aid. Since then Israel’s nuclear arsenal has expanded exponentially, both quantitatively and qualitatively, while the U.S. money spigots remain wide open.
The superior Israeli arsenal of weapons of mass destruction confines its interest in peace in the Middle East to only one option of dictating its own terms. Shimon Peres, former Israeli prime minister, leader of the Israeli Labor Party, Ben-Gurion’s aid, and responsible for the development of the Israeli nuclear arsenal for some 30 years, said that the Israeli nuclear power was the reason for Anwar Sadaat, former Egyptian president, to visit Jerusalem searching for peace. This comment implies that the Arab nations have no choice but to resign to the overwhelming Israeli nuclear force.
Israel intends to destroy any Arab or Moslem nuclear project, as it had bombed the Iraqi nuclear reactor in Osirak on 7 June 1981. In 1983, the former Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon proposed to India that it join with Israel to attack Pakistani nuclear facilities.
Within Israel, however, there was much debate among Israeli elites regarding the wisdom of developing nuclear weapons. Some Israeli leaders – ranging from former Labor Prime Ministers Golda Meir and Yigal Allon to former Likud Defense Minister Raful Eitan – argued that a nuclear Israel would increase the possibility of Arab states developing weapons of mass destruction and launching a first strike against Israel. Given the country’s small size, Israel might not have a credible second-strike capability. There is also the fact that most of Israel’s potential nuclear targets are close enough so that a shift in wind could potentially send a radioactive cloud over Israel.
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Hersh, op. cit., 217, 222-226, and Weissman and Krosney, op. cit., 107.
Hersh, op. cit., 230-231.
Hersh, op. cit., 271-275.
Hersh, op. cit., 291.
Hersh, op. cit., 319.
Hersh, op. cit., 321-235.
Hersh, op. cit., p. 19
Hersh, op. cit., pp. 285-305
Hersh, op.cit., 1991, p. 319
Hersh, op.cit., p. 319
Hersh, op.cit., pp. 242-257
Hersh, Seymour M., The Samson Option. Israel’s Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy (New York: Random House, 1991), 223.
Hersh, The Samson Option, 196.
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Hough, Harold, “Israel’s Nuclear Infrastructure,” Jane’s Intelligence Review 6, no. 11 (November 1994), 508.
Hough, Harold, op. cit., 1998, 11-12 and Berger, Julian, “Court Fury At Israeli Reactor.” Guardian, 13 October 1997, in Center for Nonproliferation, “Nuclear Abstracts,” 13 October 1997, or on-line, Internet, 22 November 1998 (http://cns.miis.edu)
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ibid, p. 153
ibid, p. 153
ibid, p. 312
ibid, p.198-200
ibid, p.2
ibid, p.43
ibid, pp 39-40
ibid, pp. 3-17
ibid, pp. 37-38
Ibid., 111.
Ibid., 230, 243.
Ibid., 234.
Ibid., 234-235 and Aronson, S, op. cit., 15-18.
Ibid., 262-263.
Ibid., 273-274.
Ibid., 37-38 and Friedman, Robert I. Zealots for Zion: Inside Israel’s West Bank Settlement Movement (New York, New York: Random House, 1992), 132-52.
Inbar, Efraim, “Israel’s security in a new international environment,” in Karsh, Efraim, Editor, Between War and Peace: Dilemmas of Israeli Security (London, England: Frank Cass, 1996), 41.
Israel and Nuclear Weapons How many nukes does Israel have — or need?, http://www.peaceheroes.com/MordecaiVanunu/israelnuclearweapons.htm
Israel and the Bomb Avner Cohen has provides a detailed account of of the political aspects of Israel’s nuclear history that draws on thousands of American and Israeli government documents-most of them recently declassified and never before cited-and more than one hundred interviews with key individuals who played important roles in this story.
Israel and the Bomb: Principal players. National Security Archive.
Israel Shahak, Open Secrets: Israeli Nuclear and Foreign Policies, London, 1997, Pluto Press, p. 40
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Israeli nuclear forces, 2002
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Jones, Meirion, “Britain’s dirty secret“, New Statesman, 2006–03-13. Retrieved on 2006–07-02.
Kaku, op. cit., 66 and Hersh, op. cit., 216.
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Karsh, op. cit., 86.
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Levran, op. cit., 8-10.
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London Sunday Times, October 12, 1986
Mark Gaffney, Dimona, The Third Temple:The Story Behind the Vanunu Revelation, Brattleboro, VT, 1989, Amana Books, p. 165 (Excellent progressive analysis of the Israeli nuclear program)
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McKinnon, Dan. Bullseye One Reactor. The Story of Israel’s Bold Surprise Air Attack That Destroyed Iraqi’s Nuclear Bomb Facility (Shrewsbury, England: Airlife Publishing Ltd., 1987).
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Milhollin, 100-119.
Milhollin, Gary, “Heavy Water Cheaters.” Foreign Policy (1987-88): 101-102.
Milhollin, op. cit., 103-104.
Nashif, op. cit., 32.
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Nashif, Taysir N., Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East: Dimensions and Responsibilities (Princeton, New Jersey: Kingston Press, 1984), 22-23.
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Nordeen, Lon O., Nicolle, David, Phoenix over the Nile (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institute Press, 1996), 192-193.
NRDC: Nuclear Notebook
Nuclear weapons – Israel. Federation of American Scientists. Retrieved on 2006–07-02.
O’Balance, Edgar, No Victor, No Vanquished. The Yom Kippur War (San Rafael, California: Presido Press, 1978), 175.
O’Balance, Edgar, The Third Arab-Israeli War (London: Faber and Faber, 1972), 54.
Obsessive secrecy undermines democracy By Reuven Pedatzur Ha’aretz. Tuesday, August 8, 2000
O’Sullivan, Arich, “New F-15I Warplanes Expand Israel’s Reach,” The Jerusalem Post, 19 January 1997 (http://www.jpost.co.il).
Ottenberg, Michael, “Estimating Israel’s Nuclear Capabilities,” Command, 30 (October 1994), 6-8.
Pedatzur, Re’uven, “South African Statement On Nuclear Test Said to Serve Israel,” Ha’aretz, 29 July 1997. On line: Internet, 22 November 1998 and Kelley, Robert. “The Iraqi and South African Nuclear W”ôNuclear Abstracts,” 1 March 1996 (http://cns.miis.edu).
Peres admits to Israeli nuclear capability. Federation of American Scientists (1998–07-14).
Peres, Shimon, Battling for Peace. A Memoir (New York, New York: Random House, Pry, 10.
Peter Hounam, Woman From Mossad: The Torment of Mordechai Vanunu, London, 1999, Vision Paperbacks, pp. 155-168
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Pry, op. cit., 75.
Pry, Peter, Israel’s Nuclear Arsenal (Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1984), 5-6.
Raviv and Melman, op. cit., 399.
Raviv, Dan and Melman, Yossi, 1990, 58.
Raviv, Dan and Melman, Yossi, Friend in Deed: Inside the U.S.-Israel Alliance (New York New York: Hyperion, 1994), 299.
Raviv, Dan and Melman, Yossi, op. cit., 1990, 344-345, 422-423.
Seymour Hersh, The Samson Option: Israel’s Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy, New York,1991, Random House, p.
Shahak, Israel, Open Secrets: Israeli Nuclear and Foreign Policies (London: Pluto Press, 1997), 72-73.
Shahak, op. cit., 4-5.
Shahak, op. cit., 78-79.
Shahak, op. cit., p150
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Smith, Gerard C. and Cobban, Helena. “A Blind Eye To Nuclear Proliferation.” Foreign Affairs 68, no. 3(1989), 53-70.
Spector, Leonard S., “Foreign-Supplied Combat Aircraft: Will They Drop the Third World Bomb?” Journal of International Affairs 40, no. 1(1986): 145 (n. 5) and Green, Living by the Sword, op. cit., 18-19.
Spector, Leonard S., The Undeclared Bomb (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger Publishers, 1988), 387 (n.22).
Spector, The Undeclared Bomb, 395(n. 57).98-199
Spector, The Undeclared Bomb, op. cit., 165-166.
Spector, The Undeclared Bomb, op. cit., 179.
Spector, The Undeclared Bomb, op. cit., 396 (n. 62); Garthoff, Raymond L., Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institute, 1994), 426, n76 and Bandmann, Yona and Cordova, Yishai. “The Soviet Nuclear Threat Towards the Close of the Yom Kippur War.” Jerusalem Journal of International Relations 1980 5, no. 1, 107-9.
Stanghelle, Harold, “Israel to sell back 10.5 tons.” Arbeiderbladet, Oslo, Norway, 28 June 1990 in: Center for Nonproliferation Studies, “Nuclear Developments,” 28 June 1990, 34-35; on-line, Internet 22 November 1998 (http://cns.miis.edu).
Statement from the Foreign Office. Newsnight. BBC (2006–03-09
Stopping the introduction of nuclear weapons into the middle east (PDF). Memorandum to the secretary of state. National Security Archive (1969–03-17
Sunday Times, London, op. cit., 1,4-5.
Tahtinen, Dale R., The Arab-Israel Military Balance Today (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1973), 34.
Terrill, W. Andrew, “The Chemical Warfare Legacy of the Yemen War.” Comparative Strategy, 10 (1991), 109-119.
The Bomb That Never Is by Avner Cohen, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May/June 2000, Vol 56, No. 3 pp.22-23
The Release of Mordechai Vanunu and US Role in Israel’s Nuclear Arsenal
The Samson Option. Israel’s Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy Seymour M Hersh, [New York: Random House, 1991]
The Third Temple’s Holy Of Holies: Israel’s Nuclear Weapons Warner D. Farr, LTC, U.S. Army, September 1999
The Third Temple’s holy of holies: Israel’s nuclear weapons. The Counterproliferation Papers, Future Warfare Series No. 2. USAF Counterproliferation Center, Air War College, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base (September 1999).
Toscano, Louis, Triple Cross: Israel, the Atomic Bomb and the Man Who Spilled the Secrets (New York: Carol Publishing Group, 1990).
U.S. Army Lt. Col. Warner D. Farr, The Third Temple Holy of Holies; Israel’s Nuclear Weapons, USAF Counterproliferation Center, Air War College Sept 1999 (www.fas.org/nuke/guide/israel/nuke/farr,htm)
Usi Mahnaimi and Marie Colvin, Israel Planning “Ethnic” bomb as Saddam Caves In, November 15, 1998, London Sunday Times
Usi Mahnaimi and Peter Conradi, Fears of New Arms Race as Israel Tests Cruise Missiles, June 18, 2000, London Sunday Times
Usi Mahnaimi, Israeli Jets Equipped for Chemical Warfare October 4, 1998, London Sunday Times
Uzi Mahnaimi and Tom Walker, London Sunday Times, February 25, 2001
Valéry, op. cit., 807-09.
Valry, Nicholas, “Israel’s Silent Gamble with the Bomb,” New Scientist (12 December 1974), 807-09.
Weissman and Krosney, 112.
Weissman and Krosney, 119-124.
Weissman and Krosney, 124-128 and Raviv, Dan and Melman, Yossi, 1990, 198-199.
Weissman and Krosney, op. cit., 109.
Weissman and Krosney, op. cit.,114-117